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Tribal Sovereign Immunity as a Defense in Overcoming 
IPR Challenges of Brand Name Pharmaceutical Patent 
Validity at PTAB—Effects on the Industry 
Elana Williams* 
INTRODUCTION 
Tribal sovereignty has been recognized by the American government since the 
establishment of the United States and tribal sovereign immunity has been a part of 
American jurisprudence for over a century.1 Tribal sovereign immunity continues to 
play an important role in modern times, especially in the last few years with the rise 
of inter partes review (IPR) proceedings stemming from the America Invents Act of 
2011.2 IPR proceedings are filed with the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) and heard by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) as an alternative 
to or in conjunction with traditional patent litigation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit.3 Therefore, patent owners may have to defend their patents both 
at PTAB and in federal court.4 
This is especially true as this situation plays out in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984 (the Hatch-
Waxman Act), patent holders face a congressionally mandated validity review 
process established to balance the protection of innovation while also facilitating the 
entrance of low-cost drug alternatives into the market.5 The Hatch-Waxman Act 
allows a pharmaceutical manufacturer to file an abbreviated new drug application 
(ANDA) with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to produce a low-cost 
generic version of a patented brand name drug.6 In order to do this, the generic 
manufacturer must include a Paragraph IV certification in its application, which 
                                                          
* Elana Williams is a third-year student at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
1 Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity under Federal 
Law: Legal, Historical and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American Indian 
Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661 (2002). 
2 Caleb A. Bates, Peter Law & Eric Furman, Sovereign Immunity and Inter Partes Review, KNOBBE 
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declares that the patents covering the drug at issue are unenforceable and invalid.7 
The generic companies may also file a petition for IPR with PTAB on issues of 
invalidity.8 
PTAB has recently granted its first motion to consider the issue of tribal 
sovereign immunity as it relates to patents covering the branded drug Restasis®.9 
This case involves two giants of the pharmaceutical industry: Allergan PLC 
(Allergan), a brand name drug manufacturer who holds the Restasis® patents, and 
Mylan N.V. (Mylan), a generic pharmaceutical company.10 Mylan challenged 
Allergan’s patents covering Restasis® in a district court where a federal judge 
invalidated the patents on obviousness grounds.11 Mylan also filed a petition with 
PTAB for IPR in relation to these patents.12 Prior to the district court ruling and after 
PTAB granted the petition for IPR, Allergan made a controversial licensing deal with 
the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe of New York state (the “Tribe”).13 Under this deal, 
Allergan transferred its patents for Restasis® to the Tribe and then licensed them 
back exclusively for a substantial amount of money in order to assert the Tribe’s 
sovereign immunity as a defense against IPR challenges.14 This transaction has been 
widely debated with some applauding the move as innovative and others ardently 
condemning it as a blatant delay tactic. Although the district court judge has already 
issued an opinion regarding the Restasis® patents, PTAB has recently extended their 
statutory deadline for issuing its final written decision from December 8, 2017 to 
April 6, 2018.15 
This Note will discuss the dual IPR and federal court system in place for 
reviewing the validity of patents and examine the discourse within the industry 
surrounding the Mylan v. Allergan case. This analysis will offer insight into the 
future of IPR challenges in the pharmaceutical context. Section I will provide 
relevant background information surrounding the issues affecting challenges of 
patent validity and implications of tribal sovereign immunity for generic 
pharmaceutical companies. Section II will examine a case study involving two 
pharmaceutical giants, Allergan and Mylan, which demonstrates the issues discussed 
                                                          
7 Id. 
8 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2016). 
9 King L. Wong, Indian Tribal Sovereign Immunity Asserted in an IPR, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 25, 
2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8646562b-50af-4668-ae72-2df6e814b69a. 





15 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2016) (PTAB must issue a final determination in an IPR no later than 
one year after the date of a decision to grant the IPR petition. If there is good cause, PTAB may extend 
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in Section I. Section III will focus on the industry split regarding these issues and 
argue that tactics that attempt to gain patent protection for brand name drugs after 
statutory coverage has expired, like the one employed by Allergan, are detrimental 
to the balance that Congress endeavors to maintain between innovation and the 
entrance of low-cost drug alternatives to the pharmaceutical market. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Issues Affecting Challenges of Patent Validity 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) was formed on 
September 16, 2012 as part of the America Invents Act and is the federal agency 
responsible for granting U.S. patents and registering trademarks.16 The Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board (PTAB) works within the USPTO.17 PTAB is composed of 
administrative patent judges (APJs), a Director and Deputy Director of the USPTO, 
the Commissioner for Patents, and the Commissioner for Trademarks.18 APJs are 
required to be persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability, who must 
have worked, at some point in their professional career, as a patent examiner at the 
USPTO.19 APJs are also generally required to have experience working in private 
practice, other government agencies, or in-house for a corporation and must be able 
to handle cases in various fields of technology.20 APJs are responsible for 
adjudicating two different types of cases.21 The first type are appeals from adverse 
decisions by patent examiners for questions of patentability in patent applications.22 
PTAB must decide the correctness of the examiner’s decision in these cases.23 The 
second type are trials under the America Invents Act to determine the patentability 
of issued patents.24 
1. Inter Partes Review 
In 2012, Congress passed the America Invents Act which created a streamlined 
procedure, known as inter partes review (IPR), for the adjudication of patent 
                                                          
16 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
17 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2016). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Jennifer R. Bush, Administrative Patent Judges: Not Your Typical Federal Judge, FENWICK & 
WEST LLP (July 10, 2014), https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/administrative-patent-judges-
not-your-typical-federal-judge.aspx. 
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challenges by the USPTO.25 PTAB has jurisdiction to hear an IPR under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 314(a), which provides that an IPR may be instituted if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims 
challenged in the petition.26 IPR provides a less expensive and expedited forum for 
patent litigation than a U.S. district court proceeding.27 The two systems are often 
used in conjunction with each other.28 IPR maintains its streamlined approach by 
holding a hearing before three APJs of PTAB rather than having a jury and by 
focusing on only specific invalidity issues to patents.29 Therefore, no infringement 
issues or enforceability issues can be addressed in the IPR system.30 
The IPR process also must be completed within one year of PTAB’s decision 
to hear the IPR.31 Either party who does not agree with PTAB’s final ruling on the 
validity or invalidity of a patent may appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, which is the court that oversees every patent appeal in the country.32 
Further, the parties may agree to settle at any time as long as PTAB agrees to end the 
IPR as well.33 Anyone other than the patent owner may file an IPR.34 This includes 
everyone from a third party to a competitor, and there is no requirement to show any 
dispute between the parties.35 For example, if Company A is ready to launch a new 
product on the market and Company B is a competitor who holds a patent that may 
block Company A’s new product from launching, Company A can file an IPR in 
order to invalidate Company B’s patent and launch its product or vice versa. 
2. Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
Understanding the concept of sovereignty is a prerequisite to understanding 
tribal sovereign immunity. Sovereignty is the supreme independent authority within 
                                                          
25 Summary of the America Invents Act, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N (2017), 
http://www.aipla.org/advocacy/congress/aia/Pages/summary.aspx. 
26 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2016). 
27 Josh Landau, Inter Partes Review: Five Years, Over $2 Billion Saved, PATENT PROGRESS 




31 Inter Partes Review, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (May 9, 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review. 
32 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2016). 
33 35 U.S.C. § 317(a) (2016) (“[A]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be 
terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and the patent owner, 
unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.”). 
34 Inter Partes Review, supra note 31. 
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a territory.36 The sovereign must have authority or the right to command and be 
obeyed derived from a mutually acknowledged source of legitimacy from within the 
community.37 The authority of the sovereign is superior to all other authorities in its 
domain.38 The sovereign must also occupy territory and the individuals residing in 
that geographical location must be subject to its authority.39 
Tribal sovereignty was recognized as early as the time of European expansion, 
into what is now the United States of America, through treaties and a legal 
framework which continued throughout the American Revolution and the 
establishment of the U.S.40 The U.S. is considered a federated state, meaning each 
state within the U.S. territory has transferred portions of their sovereign powers to 
the federal government.41 Federally-recognized tribes are also subject to the authority 
of the federal government.42 That being said, the U.S. government recognizes tribes 
as domestic sovereign, self-governing nations.43 These tribes maintain a nation-to-
nation relationship with the United States and state governments have limited power 
over tribes.44 
It is a well-established rule that a federally-recognized Native American tribe 
is immune from lawsuits by anyone other than the United States, absent the tribe’s 
consent or congressional abrogation.45 This common law rule was established 
through a series of late 19th and early 20th Supreme Court decisions.46 In Turner v. 
United States, the Court held that a tribe was barred from personal liability because 
“like other governments, municipal as well as state, the Creek Nation was free from 
liability for injuries to persons or property.”47 Further, the Court stated that “without 
authorization from Congress, the Nation could not then have been sued in any court; 
at least without its consent.”48 However, tribal sovereign immunity is a common-law 
privilege that is subject to regulation by Congress and not covered under the Eleventh 
                                                          
36 What is Sovereignty?, LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/sovereignty (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2018). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 What is Territorial Sovereignty?, supra note 36. 
40 Seielstad, supra note 1, at 683. 
41 Id. at 669. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 690. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919). 
47 Id. at 357–58. 
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Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.49 The immunity applies in federal or state court 
without regard to the relief sought or the nature of the controversy.50 This immunity 
also may be waived by the tribe involved or by undisputed congressional 
abrogation.51 Further, the immunity does not extend to actions taken by tribe 
members acting in their individual capacities, such as tribal officers or employees 
when they are alleged to have violated federal law.52 
B. Implications of Tribal Sovereign Immunity to Generic Pharmaceutical 
Companies 
Understanding of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the ANDA process is required 
to demonstrate the balance Congress has put in place for brand name manufacturers 
and generic companies working in the pharmaceutical industry. In order to bring a 
new drug to market, a brand name drug manufacturer must submit a new drug 
application (“NDA”) to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for approval, 
which is a long and costly process.53 The NDA must describe aspects like a statement 
of the drug’s components, scientific data showing that the drug is safe and effective, 
and proposed labeling describing the uses for which the drug may be marketed.54 
After the FDA has approved a brand name manufacturer’s drug, the Hatch-
Waxman Act provides a pathway for another company to seek permission to market 
a generic version of the same drug.55 The Hatch-Waxman Act allows a generic 
competitor to file an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) which utilizes the 
information from a brand name manufacturer’s already approved NDA.56 Thus, 
instead of providing independent evidence of safety and efficacy, an ANDA need 
only show that the generic drug has the same active ingredients and is biologically 
equivalent to the brand name drug.57 The Act, by allowing the generic drug 
manufacturer to use the brand name’s approval efforts, speeds up the introduction of 
low-cost generic drugs to market. Thus, the ANDA process promotes drug 
competition and provides for inexpensive alternative medications to consumers. 
The FDA is not allowed to approve a generic drug that would infringe on a 
brand name drug manufacturer’s patent, so the timing of an ANDA’s approval 
                                                          
49 Clay Smith, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A Primer, 50 ADVOC. 19, 20 (2007). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id.; see also Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017) (where the Supreme Court declined to 
extend tribal sovereign immunity to a tribal employee sued for damages in his individual capacity). 
53 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2016). 
54 Id. §§ 355(b)(1), (d). 
55 Id. 
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depends on the scope and duration of the patents covering the brand name drug.58 To 
approve generic drugs as soon as a brand name manufacturer’s patents allow, a brand 
name drug manufacturer must file information about its patents with the FDA.59 A 
brand name drug manufacturer must submit its NDA with the patent number and the 
expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for which the brand submitted 
the NDA.60 Once an NDA is approved, the FDA publishes the information in the 
“Orange Book.”61 
After consulting the Orange Book for relevant patents, a generic drug company 
wishing to file an ANDA must assure the FDA that its proposed generic drug will 
not infringe any of the listed patents.62 When no patents are listed in the Orange Book 
or all listed patents have expired or will expire before the ANDA’s approval, the 
generic manufacturer must supply assurance of this to the FDA.63 What is referred 
to as a “Section VIII” statement gives the generic manufacturer an option to market 
the drug for methods of use not covered by the brand name’s patents.64 This option 
is mainly used when the brand name’s patent on the drug compound expired, but the 
brand name still holds the patents on some approved methods of using the drug.65 A 
Section VIII statement may allow the generic manufacturer to market the drug using 
labeling that does not infringe on the methods of use still patented by the brand 
name.66 This is an exception to the rule that the generic drug must bear the same label 
as its brand name counterpart.67 This allows the generic manufacturer to get its drug 
to market, assuming it has met the other ANDA requirements, but only for the 
approved methods of use not covered by the brand name’s patents. In other words, 
the Hatch-Waxman Act allows a generic manufacturer to market a generic drug for 
unpatented uses even if other patented uses are not allowed.68 
There are several ways in which a generic manufacturer can provide assurance 
that its drug will not infringe the brand name’s patents.69 It can (1) certify that the 
                                                          
58 Caraco Pharmaceutical Labs v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012). 
59 Id. 
60 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). 
61 The Orange Book is officially called Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations. The Orange Book identifies all drug products approved by the FDA. The FDA must also list 
all patents that purport to protect each drug in the Orange Book. 
62 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(III). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). 
65 Id. 
66 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv) (2017). 
67 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v), (j)(4)(G). 
68 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). 
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brand name manufacturer has not listed any relevant patents; (2) certify that any 
relevant patents have expired; (3) request approval to market beginning when any 
still in force patents expire; or (4) certify that any listed, relevant patent is invalid or 
will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug described in the 
ANDA.70 If a generic manufacturer employs the last method (the “Paragraph IV” 
method), it is a technical infringement of the brand name drug manufacturer’s patents 
and, in most instances, leads to litigation.71 The brand name manufacturer then must 
bring an infringement suit within 45 days causing the FDA to withhold final approval 
of the generic for 30 months while the matter is litigated.72 If the court decides the 
matter within that period of time, the FDA will follow that determination; if the 
courts do not decide the matter within that time period, the FDA is free to give 
approval to market the generic drug.73 
Using the Paragraph IV method in order to be the first to file an ANDA with 
the FDA is incentivized in the Act. The applicant who files the ANDA first will 
receive 180 days of exclusivity in the market if it prevails in its litigation.74 During 
this period of exclusivity, no other generic can come to market even if the patent(s) 
in question is found to be invalid.75 The generic manufacturer that is first to file the 
ANDA is the only company that can enjoy the exclusivity period.76 If the generic 
manufacturer that is first to file the ANDA forfeits its rights to exclusivity, no other 
generic manufacturer can obtain it.77 
II. CASE STUDY: MYLAN V. ALLERGAN 
Allergan PLC (Allergan) is a global pharmaceutical company focused on 
developing, manufacturing, and commercializing branded pharmaceuticals, devices, 
and biologic products and headquartered in Dublin, Ireland.78 Mylan N.V. (Mylan) 
is an American global generic and specialty pharmaceuticals company headquartered 
in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.79 Allergan is the company that manufactures the 
                                                          
70 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
71 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2016). 
72 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2017). 
73 Id. 
74 § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
75 Id. 
76 § 355(j)(5)(D). 
77 Id. 
78 Company Profile, ALLERGAN, https://www.allergan.com/About/Company-Profile (last updated 
2018). 
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branded drug, Restasis®, which is used to treat chronic dry eye.80 Restasis® is one 
of Allergan’s blockbusters, accounting for about 15% of the company’s profits and 
making $1.5 billion in sales in 2016 alone.81 Restasis® was approved in 2003, with 
patent protection until 2014, which led generic manufacturers to prepare to enter the 
market.82 In order to block these generic companies from entering the market, 
Allergan obtained new patents claiming minor variations of the drug which have 
patent protection until 2024.83 After which time, and assuming no further 
exclusivities are granted, generic versions of the drug could enter the market leading 
to profit loss for the brand name drug manufacturer.84 
In August of 2015, Mylan was sued by Allergan in a Hatch-Waxman Act case 
surrounding the Restasis® patents.85 The suit arose when Mylan filed an ANDA with 
the FDA in order to manufacture and sell low-cost bioequivalent drugs having the 
same components as Restasis® and challenged the Restasis® patents as invalid.86 
On June 3, 2016, Mylan filed six IPR challenges with PTAB in regards to the 
Restasis® patents.87 On December 8, 2016, PTAB granted Mylan’s petitions for IPR 
finding it reasonably likely that Allergan’s evergreened patents were invalid.88 
Beginning on December 8, 2016, PTAB had a statutory deadline of exactly one year 
to complete the IPR.89 The district court litigation has been decided, however, PTAB 
has extended its statutory deadline for IPR completion from December 8, 2017 to 
April 6, 2018.90 
On September 8, 2017, exactly one-week prior to the scheduled oral hearing at 
PTAB, Allergan announced the controversial deal with New York state’s Saint Regis 
                                                          
80 Eric Sagonowsky, Mylan blasts Allergan’s ‘desperate’ tribal licensing deal on Restasis, FIERCE 
PHARMA (Sept. 13, 2017, 10:50 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/legal/mylan-blasts-allergan-s-
desperate-tribal-licensing-deal-restasis. 
81 Lydia Ramsey, One of Allergan’s blockbuster drugs was dealt a major legal blow, BUS. INSIDER 
(Oct. 16, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/allergan-restasis-patents-invalid-in-texas-district-court-
2017-10. 
82 Id. 
83 Joshua Landau, Tribal Immunity May Not Be Wonder Drug For Allergan, LAW 360 (Oct. 17, 
2017, 3:10 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/974876/tribal-immunity-may-not-be-wonder-drug-
for-allergan. 
84 Jon Hess & Shannon Litalien, Battle for the market: Branded drug companies’ secret weapons 
generic drug makers must know, 3 J. OF GENERIC MED. 20, 21 (2005). 
85 Allergan, Inc., v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at *2 
(E.D. Tex. 2017). 
86 Id. 
87 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., No. IPR2016-01130 (P.T.A.B. June 3, 2016). 
88 Landau, supra note 83. 
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Mohawk Tribe (the Tribe) to transfer ownership of six of its patents (the Patents)—
U.S. Patent Nos. 8,629,111; 8,633,162; 8,648,048; 8,685,930; and 9,248,191—for 
the branded eye drug, Restasis®, to the Tribe.91 The transaction included the full 
transfer of ownership of the Patents to the Tribe in exchange for Allergan’s $13.75 
million payment to the Tribe with eligibility for $15 million in annual royalties and 
Allergan’s retention of an exclusive license to the Patents.92 This was done in order 
to claim the Tribe’s status as a sovereign nation and shield the Patents from review 
by the USPTO and ultimately, from competitors.93 The license agreement expressly 
stated that the Tribe “will and shall assert its sovereign immunity in any Contested 
PTO Proceeding, including in the IPR Proceedings.”94 Allergan previously had to 
defend these Patents in federal district court against various generic pharmaceutical 
companies including Mylan.95 Mylan, who stated that it would “vigorously oppose 
this transparent delay tactic before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board,” filed an IPR 
petition against the Patents as well.96 The Tribe, after the ownership change, filed a 
motion to terminate the pending IPR proceedings using the defense of sovereign 
immunity.97 
In the district court litigation decided in October of 2017, Judge William 
Bryson issued a ruling regarding this dispute between Allergan and Mylan over the 
Restasis® patents.98 Before reaping the benefits of the deal, the judge invalidated 
four of the six Allergan Patents at issue because they described methods of treatment 
that were obvious in light of earlier patents granted to the company.99 More 
interestingly, however, the court condemned Allergan’s transaction with the Tribe 
stating that, “[w]hat Allergan seeks is the right to continue to enjoy the considerable 
benefits of the U.S. patent system without accepting the limits that Congress has 
placed on those benefits.”100 The court went on to seriously question the legitimacy 
of this kind of deal stating that the Tribe’s sovereign immunity should not be treated 
                                                          
91 Allergan and Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Announce Agreements Regarding RESTASIS Patents, 
ALLERGAN (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.allergan.com/news/news/thomson-reuters/allergan-and-saint-




95 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., No. IPR2016-01130 (P.T.A.B. June 3, 2016). 
96 Sagonowsky, supra note 80. 
97 Allergan Press Release, supra note 91. 
98 Jan Wolfe & Michael Erman, U.S. judge in Texas invalidates Allergan patents on Restasis, 
REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2017, 1:28 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-allergan-patents/u-s-judge-in-
texas-invalidates-allergan-patents-on-restasis-idUSKBN1CL2KE. 
99 Landau, supra note 83. 
100 Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at *4 
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as a “monetizable commodity.”101 Despite these contentions, Allergan has 
maintained that the reasoning behind this transaction was to protect against “double 
jeopardy” in patent disputes when brand name companies must defend their patents 
in both federal court and at PTAB.102 
More recently, on February 23, 2018, PTAB issued a decision denying the 
Tribe’s motion to terminate Mylan’s patent challenge regarding the Restasis® 
patents.103 PTAB determined that the Tribe did not establish that the doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity applied to IPR proceedings.104 Further, PTAB found that even 
if tribal sovereign immunity did apply, the IPR proceeding could continue with or 
without the Tribe’s participation because Allergan retained ownership interest in the 
challenged patents.105 The oral hearing for this case is now scheduled for April 3, 
2018 and PTAB has pushed its final written opinion deadline again from April 6, 
2018 to June 6, 2018.106 
This case is the first time tribal sovereign immunity will be considered by 
PTAB.107 Here, what may be the most interesting is the timing of the transaction. On 
June 3, 2016, Mylan filed six petitions for IPR review for the Restasis® patents 
which were owned at that time by Allergan.108 On September 8, 2017, one week prior 
to the date scheduled for oral hearing in the IPR, the transaction took place.109 The 
Tribe then notified PTAB about the new ownership of the patents, obtained leave, 
and filed a motion to terminate the IPR proceedings for the Restasis® patents for 
lack of jurisdiction on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity.110 The three cases prior 
to this where PTAB had considered issues of state sovereign immunity differed from 
the present case, because, in those cases, the sovereign patent owner had ownership 
                                                          
101 Id. 
102 Steve Brachmann, Double jeopardy at the PTAB forces Allergan and others to seek sovereign 
immunity defenses, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/11/02/double-
jeopardy-ptab-forces-allergan-seek-sovereign-immunity-defenses/id=89847. 
103 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2017-01127 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 
2018). 
104 Id. at 4. 
105 Id. 
106 Emma Court, Allergan denied dismissal of patent challenges for dry eye medication Restasis by 
U.S. patent board, MARKET WATCH (Feb. 26, 2018, 8:36 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ 
allergan-denied-dismissal-of-patent-challenges-for-dry-eye-medication-restasis-by-us-patent-board-
2018-02-26-891362. 
107 Landau, supra note 83. 
108 Allergan, Inc., v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at *2 
(E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017). 
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of the patents prior to the beginning of the IPR proceedings and were protected under 
the Eleventh Amendment.111 However, in this case, the patents involved in the 
transaction were already subject to IPR at the time the Tribe took ownership of them 
and there is no Eleventh Amendment defense.112 
III. THE INDUSTRY SPLIT: INNOVATION OR UNJUST DELAY TACTIC? 
The Allergan transaction at issue has stirred controversy in the industry, with 
everyone from reporters to practitioners to judges weighing in on the debate. 
Evidence of this controversy lies in the PTAB’s decision to allow submission of 
amicus briefs in the Allergan IPR proceedings for the first time in a post-grant 
challenge.113 Allergan leads one side of the discussion, hailing the transaction as an 
innovative way to ward off intellectual property challenges.114 Allergan’s CEO, 
Brent Saunders, and CLO, Bob Bailey, have said that the principal motivation behind 
this deal was to protect itself against “double jeopardy” in patent disputes from 
having to defend its patents in both federal court and from IPR challenges at 
PTAB.115 Secondarily, Allergan has stated that another goal is to help the Tribe 
become self-reliant and diversify its economy.116 In an Allergan press release about 
this transaction, Bob Bailey stated that, “the Tribe’s thoughtful and enterprising 
approach . . . will allow them to achieve their goals of self-reliance and help them 
address the most urgent needs in their community.”117 Both Allergan and the Tribe 
also stated that, “[t]his is a viable and sound opportunity for the Saint Regis Mohawk 
Tribe to enter into the patent, technology and research sector as part of [the Tribe’s] 
overall economic diversification strategy.”118 Allergan also sought to create a 
precedent for future companies to initiate similar deals in order to shield their patents 
from IPR.119 Bailey said, “I would expect it [the transaction] creates a playbook for 
other cases down the road for us and for others.”120 
                                                          
111 Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-1274 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017); 
Neochord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Balt., No. IPR20162016-208 (May 23, 2017); Reactive Surfaces Ltd. v. 
Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-1914 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 2017). 
112 Id. 
113 Savee, supra note 109. 





119 Cynthia Koons & Susan Decker, A Native American Tribe, a Drugmaker and an Unusual Patent 







J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XVIII – 2017-2018 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 










Mylan leads the other side of the debate that this “protection scheme” is an 
unjust and illegal tactic used in attempts to shield vulnerable patents from 
competition for as long as possible.121 In regards to the Tribe’s assertion of tribal 
sovereign immunity at PTAB, Mylan adamantly has maintained the position that this 
tactic could not be upheld for various reasons on the merits such as the public policy 
argument against monetizing sovereign immunity as a commodity, but also because 
the Tribe waived its immunity.122 In a telephonic hearing before PTAB on 
September 11, 2017, just three days after the transaction was made public, Mylan 
said: 
[T]his transaction is a sham. There’s no reason to believe 
that it will lead to any success. But in any case, there’s an 
unequivocal waiver here. Mylan expects to have a lot of 
arguments on the merit, but you should have confidence 
that this motion can’t succeed because they have clearly 
sought out this forum. Mylan did not drag them into this 
forum. [. . .] Rather, by their own admissions to the 
press—the press releases, they have—the tribe has said 
that they have sought this out as an opportunity that they 
are marketing to patentees, that this is basically a 
protection scheme that they have put forth. [. . .] They are 
going to patentees who they think have weak patents and 
are at risk of cancellation, and they are offering this 
protective service. They are explicitly selling 
immunity.123 
Many join Mylan in this line of reasoning including PTAB in its recent denial of the 
Tribe’s motion to terminate the IPR and Judge Bryson, the appellate court judge 
sitting by designation and presiding over the ANDA case who recently held 
Allergan’s patents invalid as obvious.124 In Judge Bryson’s opinion granting joinder 
of the Tribe to the case, he elaborates on the Court’s “serious concerns about the 
legitimacy of the tactic that Allergan and the Tribe have employed.”125 The opinion 
reads in relevant part: 
Allergan purports to have sold the patents to the Tribe, but 
in reality it has paid the Tribe to allow Allergan to 
purchase—or perhaps more precisely, to rent the Tribe’s 
sovereign immunity in order to defeat the pending IPR 
proceedings in the PTO. [. . .] What Allergan seeks is the 
right to continue to enjoy the considerable benefits of the 
                                                          
121 Transcript of Hearing at 16, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc. No. IPR2016-01127 (P.T.A.B. 
Sept. 11, 2017). 
122 Id. 
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124 Wolfe & Erman, supra note 98. 
125 Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at *4 
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U.S. patent system without accepting the limits that 
Congress has placed on those benefits through the 
administrative mechanism for cancelling invalid patents. 
If that ploy succeeds, any patentee facing IPR 
proceedings would presumably be able to defeat those 
proceedings by employing the same artifice. In short, 
Allergan’s tactic, if successful, could spell out the end of 
the PTO’s IPR program, which was the central 
component of the America Invents Act of 2011.126 
The judge shares Mylan’s concerns that this patent expiration delay tactic is a 
massive abuse of the system put in place by the legislature which could render it 
meaningless if allowed.127 Further, Judge Bryson also agrees that this 
commodification of the Tribe’s sovereign immunity cannot be tolerated.128 
Others in the industry have also harshly criticized the arrangement, including 
various senators.129 Among these Congressmen, Senator Claire McCaskill has been 
outspoken about her contempt for this deal.130 In a letter she wrote to the 
pharmaceutical lobbying group, PhRMA, she said, “[t]his is one of the most brazen 
and absurd loopholes I’ve ever seen, and it should be illegal. Given its recent 
comments regarding corporate responsibility, PhRMA can and should play a role in 
telling its members that the action isn’t appropriate, and I hope they do that.”131 
Following a bipartisan U.S. House of Representatives committee decision to 
investigate the transaction early in October of 2017, the senator introduced 
legislation seeking to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity as a defense in IPR.132 She 
went on to say, “Congress never imagined tribes would allow themselves to be used 
by pharmaceutical companies to avoid challenges to patents, and this bill will shut 
the practice down before others follow suit.”133 In putting forth this bill, Senator 
McCaskill sought to address the fear that Judge Bryson put forth in his opinion: to 
save the IPR procedure by disallowing the practice of selling tribal sovereign 




129 Meg Tirrel, Judge asks if Allergan’s patent deal with Mohawk tribe is a ‘sham’, CNBC (Oct. 6, 
2017, 5:45 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/06/judge-asks-if-allergans-patent-deal-with-mohawk-
tribe-is-a-sham.html. 
130 Id.; see also Bates et al., supra note 2 (the authors state, while discussing Senator McCaskill’s 
bill, “[t]he question also remains as to whether a patent transfer solely to assert sovereign immunity is 
vulnerable in a manner similar to piercing the corporate veil. While this question remains open at the 
PTAB, the court of public opinion has already tried this issue.”). 
131 Tirrel, supra note 129; see also Bates et al., supra note 2. 
132 Michael Erman, Senator McCaskill drafts bill in response to Allergan patent maneuver, 
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immunity for the purpose of evading PTAB. While the bill has garnered some 
support, its critics have called it discriminatory and unlikely to get at the root of the 
problem.134 
As previously mentioned, PTAB has also decided to allow amicus briefs for 
the first time in a post-grant challenge which were to be filed by December 1, 
2017.135 Jumping at the opportunity to weigh in on this issue of first impression for 
PTAB, various industry players effected by the outcome filed amicus briefs for both 
Mylan and Allergan.136 For example, U.S. Inventor, LLC, a nation-wide inventor 
advocacy organization with over 13,000 members, submitted a brief in support of 
the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe.137 Its main argument is that PTAB lacks the 
jurisdiction and expertise to make the determination in this case.138 In the brief, U.S. 
Inventor LLC claims that Congress possess exclusive authority over the application 
of sovereign immunity, and it would be a “flagrant encroachment” on that authority 
to allow PTAB to decide whether sovereign immunity may be used to divest the 
Board of Jurisdiction.139 The brief goes on to argue that the proper forum for the 
parties to challenge tribal sovereign immunity is in federal district court and 
concludes by claiming that the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on 
tribal sovereign immunity filed by the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe should be 
granted.140 
Conversely, Askeladden LLC, founder of the Patent Quality Initiative, an 
education, information, and advocacy effort to improve the understanding, use, and 
reliability of patents, filed an amicus brief in opposition to the Saint Regis Mohawk 
Tribe’s motion to dismiss.141 Askeladden LLC based its brief on four arguments: that 
(1) the Tribe’s motion is based on the misplaced theory that Tribal Sovereign 
Immunity is applicable to administrative proceedings before PTAB, (2) even if the 
Tribe cannot be compelled to participate in the proceeding, there is no requirement 
under the AIA that a patent owner participate in order for it to proceed, (3) the 
                                                          
134 Gene Quinn, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Outraged at Senator McCaskill over Sovereign 
Immunity Bill, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 6, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/10/06/saint-regis-
mohawk-tribe-outraged-senator-mccaskill-sovereign-immunity-bill/id=89007. 
135 Savee, supra note 109; see also PTAB Permits Amicus Briefing in Connection with the St. Regis 
Mohawk Tribe’s Motion to Terminate IPRs Based on Tribal Sovereign Immunity, GOODWIN (Nov. 4, 
2017), https://www.bigmoleculewatch.com/2017/11/04/ptab-permits-amicus-briefing-in-connection-
with-the-st-regis-mohawk-tribes-motions-to-terminate-iprs-based-on-tribal-sovereign-immunity. 
136 GOODWIN, supra note 135. 
137 Brief for U.S. Inventor, LLC, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Patent Owner, Mylan Pharms., Inc. 
v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2017-01127 (P.T.A.B. 2016). 
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subsequent transaction by the Patent Owner and the Tribe cannot and should not be 
entitled to divest PTAB of its rights and duty to complete these proceedings, and 
(4) the transaction is nothing more than a sham.142 The arguments put forth by 
Askeladden LLC align with those of Mylan, Judge Bryson, and Senator McCaskill, 
in reasoning that the transaction between Allergan and the Tribe is a sham and this 
behavior should not be allowed to prevent PTAB from arriving at its final written 
decisions in IPR proceedings. For those reasons, Askeladden LLC urged PTAB to 
deny the Tribe’s motion to dismiss and to complete its second look at the patents it 
previously granted, with or without the Tribe’s participation.143 
As for the public at large, many practitioners working in the industry or related 
fields have written articles, created blog posts, and taken to social media to voice 
their opinions about this unprecedented transaction. Steve Brachmann, a freelance 
writer for IPWatchdog, seems to favor the transaction as an innovative way to protect 
Allergan’s patents.144 In his piece surrounding the Allergan deal, he states that: 
The unintended problems and abuses of the IPR process 
at PTAB would concern any patent owner and naturally 
drive a party like Allergan to seek out an arbitrage 
opportunity with the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe to protect 
assets from the PTAB while engaged in Hatch-Waxman 
litigation.145 
On the other side of the debate, Joe Nacera, a columnist for Bloomberg View, 
characterized the deal between Allergan and the Tribe as Allergan’s way of evading 
the law.146 He used the word ‘sleazy’ to describe the transaction.147 Nacera went on 
to criticize Allergan for potentially paving the way to the end of the patent review 
process.148 In addition to his reaction to the deal itself, Nacera went on to explain that 
the Restasis® patents should have expired in 2014 meaning low-cost generic 
alternatives should have been available to consumers years ago.149 He combines this 
with the transaction and Allergan’s social contract to consumers of not raising its 
drug prices to reach his less than reputable opinion of the company.150 
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Along the same lines, Brad Loncar, a prominent biotech investor, was similarly 
upset by the transaction and felt it reflected poorly on the industry as a whole.151 He 
posted his opinion on his Twitter account about the transaction on the day the deal 
went public.152 Loncar said, “[t]his is going to impact all of us. Will be the next major 
black eye pharma story. Thanks [Allergan].”153 It is easy to see how this controversial 
deal has caused a large divide within the industry. Some praise the deal as an 
innovative way to escape the review of patents at PTAB. Others are shocked by the 
tactic calling it “sleazy” and a sham. Needless to say, there are many proponents and 
opponents of this transaction, all with varying opinions of how to handle tribal 
sovereign immunity as it relates to patents that a sovereign tribe obtains at the end of 
the IPR proceeding. 
There are some recent cases that have been brought before PTAB which also 
provide insight into the rationale of PTAB and how it views its role in these cases. 
The recent decision and rationale of PTAB in Ericsson Inc. and Telfonaktiebolaget 
LM Ericsson v. Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota is one of those cases. The Ericsson 
and Allergan cases share many similarities and yielded the same outcome despite the 
fact that Minnesota’s sovereign immunity is constitutionally protected and tribal 
sovereign immunity is not.154 The question before PTAB was the same as the 
question in the Allergan case: Does sovereign immunity provide a defense for a 
patent owner against IPR challenges?155 On December 19, 2017, PTAB issued an 
order dismissing the University of Minnesota’s sovereign immunity challenge and 
asserted its right to review the validity of the University’s patents.156 PTAB reasoned 
that the University had waived its own right to immunity from administrative review 
when it filed suits in district court against Ericsson and other companies accusing 
them of infringing on the same patents.157 PTAB stated: 
it would be unfair and inconsistent to allow a State to avail 
itself of the federal government’s authority by filling a 
patent infringement action in federal court, but then 
                                                          
151 Sy Mukherjee, Botox Maker Allergan’s CEO Defends Selling Drug Patents to Native American 
Tribe to Thwart Rivals, FORTUNE (Sept. 9, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/09/allergan-drug-patents-
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selectively invoke its sovereign immunity to ensure that a 
defendant is barred from requesting an IPR of the asserted 
patent from a different branch of the same federal 
government.158 
It is clear through this decision and PTAB’s dismissal of the Tribe’s motion to 
dismiss in the Allergan case that PTAB intends to limit the use of sovereign 
immunity as a defense to IPR challenges and that it believes it rightfully has 
jurisdiction to decide these matters. Due to these decisions, Allergan’s transaction 
with the Tribe will not be of use in shielding the Restasis® patents from IPR. 
If Allergan’s transaction were allowed to proceed, it could have had serious 
consequences on the patent legal framework Congress has put in place. Put another 
way, a tribe’s sovereign immunity would essentially be rendered a commodity that 
could be bought and sold in order for patent owners to evade IPR making IPR 
proceedings useless. The consequences are amplified when put in the context of the 
pharmaceutical industry. While this scheme may be beneficial to tribes who are 
looking for new sources of income as well as for innovators who hold patents for 
valuable brand name drugs, it is very detrimental to potential generic competitors 
and, in turn, consumers of drugs who may need a low-cost alternative. 
One main reason Congress created IPR proceedings was to create an efficient 
system for challenging wrongly issued patents.159 In the Allergan case, the IPR 
process Congress intended has been undermined and made inefficient through 
Allergan’s tactic. PTAB has been forced to push its statutory deadline for reaching 
its final decision from December of 2017 to June of 2018. Not only can this be 
interpreted as contrary to Congress’s intent when creating PTAB, but Allergan will 
also reap the benefits of having its blockbuster drug on the market exclusively for at 
least an extra four months. Taking into consideration that annual profits of Restasis® 
are approximately $1.5 billion, Allergan will make approximately $500 million in 
those four months disregarding any royalties owed to the Tribe.160 While this affects 
potential generic competitors, the ultimate loser in this case is the consumers who 
are left with no low-cost alternatives to the medication they need for a much longer 
time than should be allowed by law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Allergan’s tactic for delaying the expiration of its patents for the branded drug 
Restasis® is exactly what Congress in enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act sought to 
avoid. For the pharmaceutical industry to thrive, there needs to be a balance between 
the innovators who produce brand name drug products and the generic companies 
which seek to provide customers with inexpensive alternatives. Brand name 
manufactures must be incentivized to innovate by enjoying patent protection long 
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enough to recoup the expenses that went into the research and development of a new 
drug while making a profit. However, generic competitors must be allowed to enter 
the market through Congressionally created mechanisms such as IPR in order to 
provide consumers with low-cost options to the medications they desperately need. 
